Wednesday, May 25, 2016

Moscow unimpressed with political intrigue in Ankara




13 May 2016 
Ahmet Davutoglu’s decision to resign from the post of Turkish prime minister could spell further deterioration in the quality of foreign policy of Russia’s southern neighbour. Or could it be merely a departure from Turkey’s Neo-Ottoman fantasies?

 http://in.rbth.com

Moscow unimpressed with political intrigue in Ankara


Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said on May 5 that he was stepping down from his post. Preceding his forced resignation was an abrasive attack on the former professor-turned-politician by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
“You should not forget how you got your post,” the embattled head of state publicly told the man whom he handpicked first to be his foreign minister and, in August 2014, his second-in-command.
There was a time when Erdogan used to say: “This is the era of a strong president and a strong prime minister.” This is clearly no longer true.
The dramatic divergence between Turkey’s top leadership began to unveil as Erdogan stepped up his drive for absolute power, scrapping the parliamentary system and introducing presidential rule. The more authoritarian Erdogan became, the less tolerant he became of dissent and protest.
Despite Davutoglu's demonstrative loyalty to Erdogan, he failed to hide differences with the Turkish supremo over the way to handle acute internal and external crises. Some bloggers have scrupulously identified as many as 27 issues on which the duo did not see eye to eye.

Moral zeal of a bookish professor

The former professor of political science from a fringe Istanbul University proved himself as a flexible moderate on many counts, not prone to making rash and brutal solutions.
Unlike Erdogan, who sometimes gets outraged and lashes out when targeted by critics, Davutoglu did not approve of jailing journalists and academics who subscribe to a different set of values. The Prime Minister was not keen to label environmentalists as “agent provocateurs” and rough them up.
More importantly, Davutoglu seemed to be very serious on combating corruption in high places. Acting in tandem with his deputy Ali Babacan, he drafted the “transparency package,” which raised hackles among some top functionaries of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Davutoglu refused to shield four former ministers implicated in a corruption case from court hearings last year. He was quoted as saying: “We will break the arm of anyone involved in corruption, even if it is my brother.”
Rumour has it that Erdogan was not amused by the moral zeal of his appointee.

Diplomat not a warrior

This episode could have been the turning point in the relationship between the two. After elections on June 7, 2015, the AKP lost its parliament majority. Davutoglu would not rule out forming a coalition government with the main opposition party. This must have sounded like blasphemy to the hard-core conservatives within the AKP and, in their view, amounted almost to high treason.
The recent interaction with the European leaders enhanced Davutoglu’s credentials as a pragmatist with whom it was possible to do business. But when he proposed that all those refugees or economic migrants who had crossed the Aegean Sea into Greece illegally be taken back, Erdogan immediately disavowed the offer.
Davutoglu must also have crossed a red line when he suggested re-starting talks with the Kurdish militants. This ran counter to the deliberate demonization of all Kurds by pro-Erdogan officials and media in order to bolster nationalist sentiment.
Finally, while Erdogan became the target of consistent critical comments in the Western media, his prime minister was largely spared and even praised occasionally for his flexibility.
This could be one of the root causes of an anonymous blog that recently accused Davutoglu of conspiring with the West and Turkey’s enemies to challenge Erdogan, who is now routinely portrayed as an authoritarian ruler with an inflated ego and erratic habits.

Purges but no backfire

Davutoglu’s hasty resignation amid the multitude of domestic and external problems besieging Turkey serves as confirmation that internal squabbling within the AKP is the direct consequence of accumulated frustration. It is fair to assume that fissures within the ruling party reveal deeper internal divisions, not necessarily embodied in the figure of the moustachioed university theoretician.
Purges are inevitable, with members of the “inner circle” close to Davutoglu likely to be dismissed. Among the earmarked victims could be Mehmet Simsek, a deputy prime minister responsible for the economy who reportedly enjoys high repute with international investors. This would weaken the position of the relative pragmatics in the AKP and aggravate disagreements over the refugee crisis.
Speculation about the chances of Davutoglu rallying supporters of like-minded parliamentarians and establishing a separate centre of power within the AKP is groundless. Having no grassroots constituency, Davutoglu is simply an official who owes his elevation to Erdogan.
Little wonder then that his resignation has failed to make huge waves, with only a temporary four percent depreciation of the Turkish lira against the U.S. dollar. He wisely made it clear that “no one heard, or will hear, a single word from my mouth against our president.”

Revolution devouring its children

In Europe, Davutoglu’s regular interlocutors will miss him as a person with whom they spoke the same language, in many senses, but now, as one Turkish commentator has put it, he is already “entering the ‘pantheon’ of political corpses.”
The resignation was duly recorded in Russia, but was marked neither with relief (Davutoglu claimed originally it was he who ordered the shooting down of the Russian Su-24 jet in November 2015) nor regret. Moscow is aware that there is only one person who really calls the shots in Turkey, and he is intransigent when it comes to admitting mistakes.
The end of the Davutoglu era will, however, formally close the chapter of the failed diplomatic offensive known as “zero problems with neighbours,” authored by the former academic.
This is the death knell for the myth of the resurgent “Neo-Ottoman Empire,” which envisions a new alliance with Turkey at the core of it as the gravitational centre and power broker.
In fact, the rise to prominence of political Islam, largely sponsored and promoted by the AKP, the creeping Islamization of the state apparatus with an attendant spill-over in society, Erdogan’s inflated ambitions of a sultan-style reign as president: all these developments in Turkey constitute a departure from the Ataturk legacy.
Fundamentally, it is a revolution in its own right. But revolutions are known to devour their own children, are they not?
The opinion of the writer may not necessarily reflect the position of RIR or its staff.

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Sykes-Picot Agreement


Could Different Borders
Have Saved the Middle East?

 http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/13/opinion/sunday/15danforth-web.html?_r=2


THERE probably aren’t many things that the Islamic State, Jon Stewart and the president of Iraqi Kurdistan agree on, but there is one: the pernicious influence of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, a secret plan for dividing up the Middle East signed by France and Britain, 100 years ago this week. It has become conventional wisdom to argue, as Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. recently did, that the Middle East’s problems stem from “artificial lines, creating artificial states made up of totally distinct ethnic, religious, cultural groups.”
That Western imperialism had a malignant influence on the course of Middle Eastern history is without a doubt. But is Sykes-Picot the right target for this ire?
The borders that exist today — the ones the Islamic State claims to be erasing — actually emerged in 1920 and were modified over the following decades. They reflect not any one plan but a series of opportunistic proposals by competing strategists in Paris and London as well as local leaders in the Middle East. For whatever problems those schemes have caused, the alternative ideas for dividing up the region probably weren’t much better. Creating countries out of diverse territories is a violent, imperfect process.
  1. Imperial Russian
    border 1914
    150 Miles
    Tokat
    Russian control
    TURKEY
    Kizilirmak
    River
    Euphrates
    French control
    IRAN
    Antakya
    Arab territory under
    French influence
    Kirkuk
    SYRIA
    Tigris
    Euphrates
    Beirut
    British
    control
    Damascus
    IRAQ
    Baghdad
    Arab territory under
    British influence
    Haifa
    International
    zone
    Amman
    British control
    Jerusalem
    ISRAEL
    JORDAN
    EGYPT
    Arabia
    KUWAIT
    SAUDI ARABIA
    Sykes and Picot Hatch Their Plan
    In May 1916, Mark Sykes, a British diplomat, and François Georges-Picot, his French counterpart, drew up an agreement to ensure that once the Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War I, their countries would get a fair share of the spoils.
    Both countries awarded themselves direct control over areas in which they had particular strategic and economic interests. France had commercial ties to the Levant, and had long cultivated the region’s Christians. Britain intended to secure trade and communication routes to India through the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf.
    To the extent the Sykes-Picot plan made an attempt to account for the local ethnic, religious or cultural groups, or their ideas about the future, it offered a vague promise to create one or several Arab states — under French and British influence, of course.
  2. 150 Miles
    TURKEY
    Silifke
    Raqqa
    Antakya
    SYRIA
    Deir al-Zour
    Tigris
    Arab Kingdom
    of Syria
    Euphrates
    Beirut
    Damascus
    LEBANON
    Baghdad
    Mediterranean Sea
    Haifa
    IRAQ
    ISRAEL
    Amman
    Jerusalem
    JORDAN
    EGYPT
    Cairo
    SAUDI ARABIA
    Nile
    Hejaz
    Red Sea
    Faisal Dreams of a United Arab Kingdom
    In March 1920, Faisal bin Hussein, who led the Arab armies in their British-supported revolt against the Ottomans during World War I, became the leader of the independent Arab Kingdom of Syria, based in Damascus. His ambitious borders stretched across modern-day Syria, Jordan, Israel and parts of Turkey. (But not Iraq.)
    Would Faisal’s map have been an authentic alternative to the externally imposed borders that came in the end? We’ll never know. The French, who opposed his plan, defeated his army in July.
    But even if they hadn’t, Faisal’s territorial claims would have put him in direct conflict with Maronite Christians pushing for independence in what is today Lebanon, with Jewish settlers who had begun their Zionist project in Palestine, and with Turkish nationalists who sought to unite Anatolia.
  3. 150 Miles
    TURKEY
    Alexandretta
    Aleppo
    State of Aleppo
    Alawite
    State
    Deir al-Zour
    Tigris
    SYRIA
    LEBANON
    Euphrates
    State of Damascus
    Beirut
    Damascus
    Mediterranean
    Sea
    Druze State
    IRAQ
    Haifa
    ISRAEL
    Amman
    Jerusalem
    JORDAN
    EGYPT
    SAUDI ARABIA
    France Divides ‘Syria.’
    When France took control of what is now Syria, the plan in Paris was to split up the region into smaller statelets under French control. These would have been divided roughly along ethnic, regional and sectarian lines: The French envisioned a state for Alawites, another for Druse, another for Turks and two more centered around Syria’s biggest cities, Damascus and Aleppo.
    This cynical divide-and-conquer strategy was intended to pre-empt Arab nationalists’ calls for a “greater Syria.” Today, five years into Syria’s civil war, a similar division of the country has been suggested as a more authentic alternative to the supposedly artificial Syrian state. But when the French tried to divide Syria almost a century ago, the region’s residents, inspired by ideas of Syrian or Arab unity, pushed by new nationalist leaders, resisted so strongly that France abandoned the plan.
  4. RUSSIA
    200 Miles
    Black Sea
    BULGARIA
    International
    Constantinopolitan
    State
    GEORGIA
    AZERBAIJAN
    ARMENIA
    Armenia
    Turkey
    TURKEY
    Kurdistan or joined
    to Mesopotamia
    Smyrna: semi-autonomous
    within Turkey
    IRAN
    Tigris
    Syria
    Mesopotamia
    SYRIA
    Lebanon: semi-autonomous
    within Syria
    IRAQ
    Mediterranean Sea
    ISRAEL
    Euphrates
    JORDAN
    KUWAIT
    Arabia

    Nile
    EGYPT
    SAUDI ARABIA
    Red Sea
    Americans to the Rescue?
    In 1919, President Woodrow Wilson sent a delegation to devise a better way to divide the region. Henry King, a theologian, and Charles Crane, an industrialist, conducted hundreds of interviews in order to prepare a map in accordance with the ideal of national self-determination.
    Was this a missed opportunity to draw the region’s “real” borders? Doubtful. After careful study, King and Crane realized how difficult the task was: They split the difference between making Lebanon independent or making it part of Syria with a proposal for “limited autonomy.” They thought the Kurds might be best off incorporated into Iraq or even Turkey. And they were certain that Sunnis and Shiites belonged together in a unified Iraq. In the end, the French and British ignored the recommendations. If only they had listened, things might have turned out more or less the same.